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ARTICLES
THE OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990: A LOOK
AT ITS IMPACT ON THE OIL INDUSTRY
JEFFERY D. MORGAN*
INTRODUCTION
n the environmental frenzy which followed 1989's 10.9 million gal-
lon Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska's Prince William Sound, Con-
gress managed to break nearly two decades of legislative gridlock by
enacting the United States' first comprehensive oil pollution statute,
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 ("OPA"). Eschewing existing domestic
and international oil spill liability schemes, Congress drafted tough
new requirements for shippers of oil to the United States, prompting
at least one commentator to declare the oil-dependent United States
"the first nation in history that has tried to blockade itself."1
Not surprisingly, the oil industry widely criticized OPA and pre-
dicted a variety of disastrous effects, both short and long-term. Most
of the predicted short-term effects have not appeared, and those
which have appeared have not proven disastrous. The possible long-
term effects of OPA, however, do raise some reasons for concern.
These concerns warrant congressional attention and should be ad-
dressed in amendments to OPA.
First, this Article will review the historical background from which
OPA developed, taking into account preexisting domestic oil spill leg-
islation.2 Second, this Article will examine the actual provisions of
OPA. Third, this Article will discuss both the oil industry's response
to OPA and the short-term effects of OPA. Fourth, this Article will
consider the potentially adverse long-term effects of OPA. Finally,
this Article will suggest possible reforms which should be enacted in
amendments to OPA.
* Teaching Fellow, Stanford Law School. B.A. 1987, McNeese State University;
J.D. 1991, Tulane Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful com-
ments and criticisms of Professor Hank Greely of Stanford Law School.
1. Tanker Industry Spokesman Warns of Faults in U.S. Oil Pollution Law, OIL &
GAS J., July 27, 1992, at 41.
2. TWo international conventions address oil spill liability. See International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S.
3, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 45 (1970); International Convention on the Establishment of
an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, 11
I.L.M. 284 (1972). However, since the United States has refused to ratify either
agreement, this Article does not discuss their provisions.
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I. BACKGROUND TO OPA
A. History of Federal Oil Spill Legislation
A review of the fragmented body of law governing oil spills is essen-
tial to a proper understanding of OPA's historical significance. In
1851, motivated by a desire to protect the U.S. shipping industry, Con-
gress enacted the Limitation of Liability Act.3 This statute limited the
liability of vessel owners to the post-casualty value of the vessel. The
extreme consequences of this statute became apparent in 1967 with
the wreck of the Torrey Canyon, which spilled over 100,000 tons of
crude oil into the English Channel, fouling 100 miles of British and
French coasts.4 Although by that time Congress had enacted the Oil
Pollution Act of 1924, the statute merely placed limitations on the de-
liberate discharge of oil into coastal waters.5 Thus, under the Limita-
tion of Liability Act, compensation for the $8 million cleanup costs
occasioned by the Torrey Canyon spill was limited to $50 - the value
of the sole surviving lifeboat.6
In 1969, just two years after the Torrey Canyon spill, an oil platform
blow-out sent oil spewing into the picturesque Santa Barbara Chan-
nel. Images of oil-soaked shores and sea birds were broadcast into
living rooms across the United States, energizing the budding Ameri-
can environmental movement.7 Congress quickly recognized that oil
pollution had become a serious problem, inadequately addressed by
its previous legislation. Accordingly, in 1970, Congress brought oil
pollution within the scope of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
("FWPCA"),8 which had previously applied only to sewage and indus-
trial discharge. For the first time, Congress had authorized actions for
oil spill cleanup costs.
Under the FWPCA, as subsequently amended, the party responsi-
ble for discharging oil into U.S. waters was also responsible for its
cleanup. If the responsible party was unable to properly clean up the
affected area, the federal government was authorized to do so and
hold the responsible party strictly liable for cleanup costs.9 However,
3. 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1988).
4. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCi-
ENCE, AND POLICY 135 (1992); Michael P. Donaldson, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990:
Reaction And Response, 3 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 284-85 (1992).
5. 43 Stat. 604 (1924) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 431-37 (1988), later repealed at
Pub. L. 91-224, 84 Stat. 113, Title 1, § 108 (1970)).
6. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 135.
7. Id. at 2, 4.
8. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988), amended by 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-52, 1268-70,
1319, 1321, 1324 (Supp. 1991).
9. The only defenses available to a responsible party under the FWPCA were
when discharge was caused solely by:
(1) Act of God,
(2) Act of war,
(3) Negligence of the United States Government,
(4) Act or omission of a third party, or
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the statute provided specific liability limits. In the case of vessels car-
rying oil cargo, liability was limited to $250,000 or $150 per gross ton,
whichever was greater. 10 Even though the FWPCA permitted unlim-
ited liability in the case of willful negligence or willful misconduct, the
statute's liability limits proved to be excessively lenient and provided
incomplete coverage for oil pollution damages."
Additionally, liability for oil pollution was also limited under state
law. Although the FWPCA did not preempt state laws providing for
unlimited recovery of actual cleanup costs, 12 state claims were subject
to the Limitation of Liability Act. Thus, where the source of oil dis-
charge was a vessel, even under state law recovery was limited to the
post-accident value of the vessel. Moreover, federal maritime law
preempted the recovery of damages by individual claimants unless the
person seeking recovery had suffered physical damage to a proprie-
tary interest.' 3
In the 1970s, in addition to the more general provisions of the
FWPCA, Congress enacted a number of laws addressing oil spills re-
sulting from specific activities or occurring in specific locations. The
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act ("TAPAA") 14 dealt with oil
spills from vessels transporting oil from the Trans-Alaska Pipeline to
U.S. ports. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of
1978 ("OCSLA")'5 focused on the discharge of oil both from offshore
facilities located on the Outer Continental Shelf and from vessels
(5) Any combination of the above.
33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(3)
.
10. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1).
11. Donaldson, supra note 4, at 284-85.
12. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(o)(2) (1988).
13. State of Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985)
(en banc), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986); Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru,
764 F.2d 50 (1st Cir. 1985).
Examples of nonrecoverable economic losses that do not constitute physical dam-
age to a proprietary interest include:
(1) Shipping and/or other shipping type interests unable to traverse the [oil spill]
area. This includes claims with respect to vessels actually in the area at the time or
rerouted around the area at the time.
(2) Marina and boat rental operators.
(3) Wholesale and retail seafood enterprises not actually engaged in fishing,
shrimping, crabbing or oystering in the mandated area.
(4) Seafood restaurants.
(5) Tackle and bait shops.
(6) Fishermen, oystermen, shrimpers and crabbers who engaged in these activities
for recreational purposes only.
State of Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 524 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D. La. 1981),
aff'd on other grounds, 728 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1984), aff'd en banc, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986). But see Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of
Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968) (permitting recovery of damages notwithstanding
the absence of physical damage to a proprietary interest). See also Donaldson, supra
note 4, at 284-85.
14. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-55 (1988).
15. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1801-66 (1988).
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transporting oil from such offshore facilities. Finally, the Deepwater
Port Act ("DPA") 16 applied to oil handling facilities located beyond
the U.S. territorial sea and used for the trans-shipment of oil from
tankers to pipelines.17
TAPAA, OCSLA, and the DPA each imposed strict liability on par-
ties responsible for the discharge of oil. Each statute established its
own scheme of liability limits. Furthermore, each statute set up a sep-
arate fund to cover cleanup costs exceeding liability limits.
Proposals to streamline this patchwork of oil spill laws remained
bogged down in Congress throughout the 1980s. Then, on March 24,
1989, the Exxon Valdez went aground in Prince William Sound,
Alaska. Television crews swarmed to the site, and Americans wit-
nessed the damage caused by approximately 11 million gallons of
spilled oil. As thick black sludge washed onto the formerly pristine
coast, wildlife activists scurried around heaping piles of animal car-
casses in an effort to rescue marine mammals and sea birds. Even
those individuals who previously had not considered themselves part
of the now well-organized American environmental movement, were
outraged by the daily images. The nation gasped, and Congress're-
sponded in a rare act of unanimity, enacting the'final draft of OPA
without a single dissenting vote.1 8
B. The Provisions of OPA
1. Liability and Damages
OPA places strict liability on the "responsible party," which it de-
fines in the case of vessels as "any person owning, operating, or de-
mise chartering the vessel."19 Notably, this definition does not include
the owner of the oil cargo aboard the vessel. With respect to offshore
oil facilities, OPA defines "responsible party" as the "lessee or permit-'
tee of the area in which the facility is located or the holder of a right
of use and easement" granted under state law or OCSLA.2 ° A re-
sponsible party may establish a defense to liability only if he or she
can show, by a preponderance of evidence, that the sole cause of the
discharge was an act of God, an act of war, or an act or omission of a
third party.2'
16. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-24 (1988).
17. Only one such facility currently exists, the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (here-
inafter LOOP).
18. 136 CONG. REC. S11,547 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990); 136 CONG. REC. H6,949
(daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990).
19. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32)(A) (1988).
20. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32)(C). For onshore facilities and pipelines, the responsible
party is the owner or operator of the facility or pipeline, respectively. 33 U.S.C.
§ 2701(32)(B), (E).
21. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a). The third party defense does not apply if the third party
is an employee, agent, or someone in a contractual relationship with the responsible
party. Id.
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OPA expands damages for oil spills beyond those previously avail-
able under federal law. Individual claimants may recover damages for
several types of injury. Most notably, OPA recognizes, as recoverable
damages, loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to in-
jury of natural resources. 22 Therefore, hotel owners, pleasure craft
lessors, and coastside restauranteurs may recover under the statute.
OPA also recognizes a right of recovery for economic losses stemming
from the destruction of real or personal property, whether the claim-
ant owns or leases the property.23 As such, for the first time, even
when the claimant has no claim for physical loss, as in the case of a
lessee, he or she may still recover. The statute further permits recov-
ery by individual claimants who rely upon natural resources for
subsistence.24
Further, a federal, state, foreign government, or Indian tribe trustee
may recover damages for injury to natural resources, including the
reasonable cost of assessing the damage.2" Federal and state govern-
ments may also recover damages for the loss of taxes, royalties, rents,
fees, or profits brought about by injury to property or natural re-
sources.26 Moreover, states may claim damages for the costs of pro-
viding additional public services necessitated by an oil spill. Such
services include those designed to protect the public from fire, safety,
or health hazards.27 Finally, consistent with previous oil spill legisla-
tion, OPA provides for the recovery of cleanup and removal costs.
28
2. Limitations on Liability
The expansive damages recognized under OPA are seemingly bal-
anced by liability limits. For tank vessels greater than 3000 gross tons,
the limit on liability is the greater of $1200 per gross ton or $10 mil-,
lion. For tank vessels between 300 and 3000 gross tons, the limit is the
greater of $1200 per gross ton or $2 million. For all other vessels, the
limit is the greater of $600 per gross ton or $500,000. The liability
limit for offshore facilities is $75 million plus the cost of cleanup.29
After liability limits are reached, damages are to be paid from the Oil
Spill Liability Trust Fund, which has the authority to spend up to $1
billion per incident.30
22. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E).
23. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(B).
24. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(C).
25. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(A).
26. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(D).
27. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(F).
28. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a), (b)(1).
29. 33 U.S.C. § 2704. The liability limit for onshore facilities and deepwater ports
is $350 million. Id.
30. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701(11), 2712; 26 U.S.C. § 9509. The Fund receives five cents
for each barrel of oil, imported and domestic, transported in U.S. waters.
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Owners of vessels weighing more than 300 gross tons must maintain
proof of financial responsibility in an amount equal to the maximum
amount of liability to which they might be exposed.31 Owners of off-
shore facilities must maintain evidence of financial responsibility
equaling $150 million.32  If financial responsibility is maintained
through insurance,.the insurer becomes a "guarantor" and is subject
to direct suit.33
Notwithstanding OPA's liability limits, potentially responsible par-
ties may not rest assured that they will be entitled to invoke the liabil-
ity limits. The statute provides for unlimited liability in the event of
gross negligence, willful misconduct, failure to report a spill, failure to
cooperate in connection with cleanup, or violation of an applicable
federal safety, construction, or operating regulation.34
Moreover, OPA does not preempt the authority of individual states
to impose unlimited liability on parties responsible for discharging oil.
Indeed, OPA specifically provides that the preexisting Limitation of
Liability Act similarly does not preempt state law.35 Thus, OPA's lia-
bility limits provide no protection for responsible parties sued under
state law.
Furthermore, under OPA's subrogation provision, even the Oil Spill
Fund may proceed against the responsible party based on state unlim-
ited liability laws. That is, once a responsible party has paid damages
up to OPA's liability limits, the Fund will take over and pay further
cleanup costs up to $1 billion. The Fund then becomes "subrogated to
all rights, claims and causes of action that the claimant has under any
other law."'36 Thus, if the Fund has paid the cleanup costs of an indi-
vidual state, it becomes subrogated to that-state's rights. In this way,
the responsible party's liability limit under OPA effectively becomes
$1 billion.37
3. Regulatory Changes
OPA mandates that all new vessels built for oil transportation be
equipped with a double hull when operating in U.S. waters or the U.S.
exclusive economic zone.38 For existing vessels, the double hull re-
quirement is phased in over several years, depending upon the size
31. 33 U.S.C. § 2716.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1), (2).
35. 33 U.S.C § 2718. By August 1991, no fewer than 36 states, among them Cali-
fornia, Connecticut, Louisiana, and Maine, had imposed unlimited liability on petro-
leum carriers. Janet Plume, 1990 Law Transforms Oil Barge Industry, J. OF COM.,
Feb. 21, 1991, at 9A [hereinafter Plume I]; A.F. Bessemer Clark, The U.S. Oil Pollu-
tion Act of 1990, LLOYD'S MARI. & COMM. L. Q., May 1991, at 247, 250 n.11.
36. 33 U.S.C. § 2715(a) (1988).
37. See Clark, supra note 35.
38. 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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and age of the vessel. This retrofit requirement begins in 1995 and
proceeds in successive stages until 2010, when all vessels over 5000
gross tons must be equipped with double hulls.39 An exception to this
rule exists for vessels that currently have either only double bottoms
or double sides and for vessels offloading more than sixty miles from
the coast. These vessels must have double hulls by 2015.40
OPA also contains prevention and early response provisions.
Among these many provisions, the statute authorizes the federal gov-
ernment to examine records for alcohol and drug offenses of mariners
seeking licenses or various other documents. 4' It also establishes a
national planning and response system,42 and requires owners and op-
erators of tank vessels and facilities to prepare and submit individual
response plans.43
II. THE SHORT-TERM EFFECTS OF OPA
Faced with OPA's expansive damages provisions, deceptive liability
limits, and expensive double hull requirements, there is little wonder
that much of the petroleum shipping industry responded to the legisla-
tion with outrage. The industry warned that the new law would
threaten imported oil supplies to the United States. It predicted that
the possibility of open-ended claims would scare away legitimate com-
panies unwilling to risk their assets each time they ship a load of oil to
the United States. Instead, "rust bucket" tanker owners without the
resources to cover cleanup costs or satisfy damage claims would be
attracted to U.S. waters as they would have little to lose. The result, it
warned, would be higher oil prices and more oil spills. 44 The industry
further cautioned that large companies would restructure operations
in an effort to shield assets. In a final act of desperation, some ship-
ping companies threatened to boycott the United States.45 However,
these industry pronouncements, made while OPA was still being con-
sidered by legislative committees, were widely viewed as an attempt to
influence legislators.46
A. Transportation of Imported Oil to the United States
Presently, three-and-a-half years after OPA was signed into law, it is
possible to preliminarily examine its real impact. In short, most vessel
39. 46 U.S.C. § 3703a(c)(3).
40. 46 U.S.C. § 3703a(b)(3), (c)(4).
41. 46 U.S.C. § 7101.
42. 33 U.S.C. § 13210).
43. 33 U.S.C. § 13210)(5).
44. Allanna Sullivan, Oil Firms, Shippers Seek to Circumvent Laws Setting No Lia-
bility Limit for Spills, WALL ST. J., July 26, 1990, at B1.
45. Robin Buckner Price, U.S. Oil Spill Law to Cause Growing Tanker Problem,
OIL & GAS J., Sept. 30, 1991, at 21.
. 46. Brewer, Boycott Threat Seen as Lobbying Tactic, LLOYD'S LIST, July 4, 1990, at
10.
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owners have not refused to carry oil to the United States. However,
the industry's prediction that the Act would prompt responsible ship-
pers to cease operations in U.S. waters has not proven totally invalid.
Shell immediately withdrew its fleet from U.S. trade waters, opting
instead to use chartered vessels for the transport of its oil to the U.S.
mainland.47
Shell has also started to decrease the size of its tanker fleet from
ninety to fifty vessels and to phase out its third-party transportation
business.48 Following Shell's lead, a number of international shipping
companies have barred their tankers from calling at U.S. ports, includ-
ing Teekay Shipping, Elf Aquitaine, A.P. Moller, Petrofina, and
Maersk.49 Amoco has trimmed its chartering business that carries oil
owned by third parties, but continues to ship its own oil to its four
U.S. refineries."0 Chevron has significantly reduced its deliveries in
U.S. waters.5" Furthermore, a number of tanker owners, including
Shell, have refused to carry heavy crude and other "dirty oils" to the
United States. Such crudes and other heavy fuels are considered
"dirty" because they are difficult and costly to clean up in the event of
a spill.5"
Hawaii has become all too familiar with shippers' fears of heavy
fuel oil. In April 1992, Pacific Resources Inc., the leading supplier of
oil to the Hawaiian islands, stopped shipping industrial fuel oil to the
islands and warned that it might pull out of the tanker trade alto-
gether. Chevron also ceased shipments to Kauai and attempted to
convince the island's local utility to buy diesel oil. While diesel oil is
costlier than industrial-grade fuel, it carries less liability risk since it is
lighter and easier to clean up in the event of a spill along the islands'
sensitive coasts.53
Faced with the prospect of an estimated thirty percent increase in
electricity costs, Hawaii's state legislature quickly passed legislation
temporarily limiting oil spill liability under state law to $700 million. 4
47. Derek Bamber, Oil Tanker Market Never Up Long, PETROLEUM ECONOMIST,
Aug. 1991, at 15.
48. Price, supra note 45, at 21.
49. These companies, like Shell, do permit their vessels to call at the 'Louisiana
Offshore Oil Port. LOOP is the United States's only deepwater port that is located a
sufficient distance from oil sensitive coastlines to ease shipper's concerns. Amy Feld-
man, Aloha, FORBES, May 11, 1992, at 20. Price, supra note 45, at 21.
50. Amoco Trims Charters, PLATT'S OILGRAM NEWS, Feb. 3, 1993, at 3.
51. Price, supra note 45, at 21.
52. Aviva Freudmann, Oil Tanker Owners Adjust to Risks Under Pollution Law, J.
OF COM., Feb. 21, 1991, at A9.
53. Feldman, supra note 49, at 20; Jim Mulrenan, Hawaiian Concern Over Oil Pol-
lution Act May Lead to Amendment of Legislation, LLOYD'S LIST, June 8, 1992; Har-
old Morse & Rod Thompson, Big Isle, Maui Oil Shipments Will Resume, HONOLULU
STAR-BULL., Apr. 15, 1992, at 1. See also Hawaiian Electric Unit Shedding Fuel Barge
Due to Liability Risks, ELECTRIC UTIL. WEEK, June 29, 1992, at 18.
54. 1992 Haw. Sess. Laws 130.
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This legislative action was sufficient to convince oil suppliers to tem-
porarily resume shipments. Industry groups, however, suggest that a
long-term solution must come at the federal level. Indeed, Hawaii's
Department of Business, Economic Development, and Tourism has
suggested to the state's congressional delegation the possibility of
amending OPA. The congressional delegation, however, has not yet
deyeloped a position on possible amendments. 5 Meanwhile, Hawaii
Electric Light Company, which produces about fifty-eight percent of
its power from fuel oil, continues contingency planning to convert to
costly, diesel fuel. 6
B. Corporate Restructuring and Changes in Vessel Ownership
As industry experts had further predicted, many tanker operators
have reorganized their corporate structures in an effort to protect
their parent companies from the reaches of OPA and its potential for
unlimited liability. This restructuring has taken place notwithstanding
the advice of maritime safety experts urging closer links between own-
ers and ship operations to raise industry safety standards. Indeed, the
chairman of the International Association of Independent Tanker
Owners ("Intertanko") has labeled restructuring counterproductive
and suggested that shipowning companies should be wholly integrated
to ensure that top executives are directly involved in ship
management..
Typical of the restructurings is Leif Hoegh & Company, one of Nor-
way's largest. shipowners, which has transferred its tankers to a new
subsidiary, Bona Shipping. The company readily admits that it began
restructuring following an assessment of the OPA. While the new sub-
sidiary is wholly owned by Leif Hoegh, the parent company's long-
term goal is to turn the subsidiary into a publicly traded company,
attracting outside investors and enabling Leif Hoegh to reduce its
sharehold to less than fifty percent. 8
In a more subtle move, Exxon Corporation has reorganized its ship-
ping subsidiary, Exxon Shipping Company. The subsidiary received a
new name, as did each of its U.S.-flagged tankers. Additionally, the
subsidiary's board of directors was reshuffled and, for the first time,
includes directors from outside the parent corporation. While Exxon
Corporation conceded that the move was due, in part, to the impact of
55. Mulrenan, supra note 53, at 2; Argument for Liability Limits in Hawaii Goes
Federal, OIL SPILL U.S. L. REP., July 1992; Hawaii Studying OPA 90's Impact on Ship-
ping, OIL SPILL INTELLIGENCE REP., June 25, 1992.
56. Morse & Thompson, supra note 53, at 1.
57. Janet Porter, Tanker Industry Divided on Restructuring, J. OF COM., Oct. 21,
1992, at lB.
58. Id. In a similar move to avoid liability for future spills, I.M. Skaugen, another
of Norway's large shipping groups, spun its U.S. oil transfer shipping activities into a
separate company. Janet Plume, 1990 Law Transforms Oil Barge Industry, J. OF
COM., Aug. 19, 1991, at 10B [hereinafter Plume II].
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OPA, it expressly denied that it was a legal maneuver designed to
shield itself from the future liabilities of its subsidiary. Rather, the
corporation asserted that, even before the reorganization, its shipping
subsidiary was liable for its own actions separate and apart from the
parent corporation.59 However, it cannot be denied that the reorgani-
zation places further distance between the two companies and their
respective assets.
OPA's impact, however, has not been limited to large seafaring
crude tankers. Domestic parent corporations, unwilling to risk the in-
creased liability under OPA, have been selling off tanker barge com-
panies. Inland tanker barge fleets, which transport an estimated thirty
percent of all the petroleum consumed in the United States, fre-
quently traverse the waters of numerous states and, as a result, are
especially vulnerable to state unlimited liability schemes.6°
Of course, given the "greener than thou" climate of corporate
America, parent corporations are not always forthright about the mo-
tive for selling tanker barge subsidiaries. When New York-based Se-
qua Corporation sold its tanker barge company, Sabine Towing and
Transportation Company, the official reason given for the transaction
was that petroleum products no longer fit into the parent company's
identity as a manufacturer of aerospace components. However, the
company announced no similar divestiture of another of its barge sub-
sidiaries which transports steel and grain. Indeed, executives at Sab-
ine admitted that the parent company's decision to sell was influenced
by the unlimited liability imposed on petroleum carriers by state
legislatures.6'
Industry experts hope that the trend toward divestiture of inland
barge fleets will result in the consolidation of the tanker barge indus-
try into a few strong companies able to spend time and money main-
taining equipment and safety procedures. Yet, they fear that the
actual result will be an increased entry into the marketplace by under-
capitalized, substandard operators who will simply walk away from
spills. 62
Considering the aforementioned examples, one must acknowledge
that the oil industry's early warnings were not totally without merit.
59. Joel Glass, Exxon Plans U.S. Shipping Unit Shake-Up, LLoYD'S LIST, Mar. 3,
1993. Other shipowners have chosen to maintain their present corporate structure,
conceding that restructuring would not "outsmart" lawyers. Porter, supra note 57, at
lB.
60. Plume II, supra note 58, at 1A. See also Barge Industry Spokesman Calls for
Changes in Oil Pollution Act, BC Cycle, Sept. 15, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File.
61. Plume II, supra note 58, at 1A. Similarly, Ashland Oil Company has sold its
Great Lakes tanker barge operation. The company explained that the sale was pre-
cipitated by the unlimited liability provisions of several states along the Great Lakes.
Id.
62. Id.
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When major oil companies cut back on transporting their own oil in
favor of third-party charter vessels, the abundant assets of those com-
panies become unavailable under OPA should a spill occur. Likewise,
unless litigants are able to "pierce the corporate veil," the strategic
restructuring of corporate entities will place assets out of reach from
potential plaintiffs. In both situations, the end result is an increased
likelihood that cleanup costs and damages will be borne by the tax-
funded Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.
However, the industry's doomsday predictions have not proven ac-
curate. The United State's flow of imported oil has not been reduced,
nor have U.S. oil spills increased. A study commissioned by the U.S.
Department of Energy ("DOE") concluded that most tanker owners
have continued trading to the United States at the same rate as they
were prior to the enactment of OPA.63 Moreover, many of these com-
panies have established closer links with independent shipowners and
have fashioned thorough inspection programs for chartered vessels.
These programs seem to have effected a small but noticeable improve-
ment in the safety of chartered tankers.' 4 According to the DOE-
commissioned study, the most perceptible effect of the Act, thus far,
has been the change in operational procedures, safety provisions, and
inspection routines implemented in the oil trades.65 The study noted
that "the early signs of a flight to quality provides a stark contrast to
the fears of many OPA critics who forecast that U.S. oil imports would
be carried in inferior ships by uncaring owners for unscrupulous char-
terers. The exact opposite is occurring. '66
C. Spill Prevention and Response
Significantly, reports show a marked reduction in the number and
size of oil spills in U.S. waters since the enactment of OPA.67 While
many observers attribute this trend to sheer luck, others credit OPA's
liability provisions for generating fear among shipowners and creating
an atmosphere of increased vigilance in the oil industry.68
63. Office of Domestic & Int'l Energy Policy, United States Dep't of Energy,
Transporting U.S. Oil Imports: The Impact of Oil Spill Legislation on the Tanker Mar-
ket, prepared by the Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, June 1992 [hereinafter
PIRF Study].
64. The Tanker Advisory Center, which annually rates the condition of the world's
tankers on a scale from 1 to 5, noted that tankers in U.S. waters averaged 3.6 by
March 1992. Immediately prior to the Alaskan spill, that average had been 3.4.
Michael Parrish, Drop in U.S. Oil Spills Tied to Tough Laws, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 22,
1992, at Al.
65. See PIRF Study, supra note 63.
66. Id.
67. Decline Listed For Spills Off the U.S., OIL & GAS J., Oct. 5, 1992, at 30; Tanker
Spill Study Charts Recent Gains, PLATr's OILGRAM NEWS, Aug. 28, 1992.
68. Rep. W.J. "Billy" Tauzin, Chairman of the House Coast Guard and Navigation
Subcommittee, described the lack of spills as "extraordinary," noting that
"[s]omebody's scared to death out there." Penny Bender, Lawmakers Question Coast
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When spills have occurred, OPA's spill response provisions gener-
ally have been credited with quick and effective cleanup. In the larg-
est spill since the Valdez disaster, the Morris J. Berman discharged
750,000 gallons of heavy oil off the coast of Puerto Rico on January 7,
1994. Within twenty hours of the spill, tons of equipment had been
delivered to the site and response crews commenced containment of
operations. In the end, most of the damage was restricted to a one-
mile stretch of the coastline. Industry experts agree that' such a feat
would not have been possible without OPA's rapid mobilization provi-
sions that require that emergency spill supplies be prepositioned
around the United States.69
Moreover, given that occasional spills are inevitable regardless of
safety precautions, OPA's stiff liability provisions have prompted
some shippers to rethink traditional shipping routes. This is most evi-
dent off the coast of California. California is particularly sensitive to
oil spills as its scenic coastline attracts millions of tourists each year.
Thus, it is widely considered by tanker owners to be the worst place to
spill oil in U.S. waters. As a result, Arco, Exxon, British Petroleum
and seven other oil shipping companies, all of which carry Alaskan
crude to California, have voluntarily agreed among themselves to op-
erate at least fifty miles off the California coast. The shippers will only
breach the fifty-mile limit when coming into port. This strategy re-
flects expert predictions that a major oil spill fifty miles offshore
would break up before reaching the California coast.7" Therefore, on
the whole, the statute's short-term impact generally appears to be pos-
itive, notwithstanding OPA's tendency to encourage asset cloaking
behavior.
III. THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF OPA
Although the industry's incendiary warnings have not proven accu-
rate, the possible long-term effects of OPA do raise some reasons for
concern. The potential for unlimited liability, coupled with the stat-
ute's requirement that insurers serve as guarantors, has resulted in the
insurance industry's refusal to issue proof of financial responsibility to
vessel owners. Without proof of financial responsibility, vessels can-
not enter U.S. waters. Thus far, regulators have avoided this conflict
by refraining from enforcing OPA's financial responsibility require-
ments. Ultimately, however, this conflict must be resolved. Further-
more, OPA's failure to create even a qualified exemption for vessel
Guard On Safety of Oil Tankers, GANNETT NEWS SERV., Feb. 17, 1993; See also De-
cline Listed For Spills Off the U.S., supra note 67, at 30; Big Drop Found in US. Oil
Spills, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1992, at A31; Parrish, supra note 64, at Al.
69. Tom Kenworthy, San Juan Spill Tests Oil Pollution Act, WASH. POST, Jan. 10,
1994, at A4; Massive Spill Off Puerto Rico, LLOYD'S LIST, Jan. 8, 1994, at 1.
70. Alaskan Crude Oil Tankers to Stay 50 Miles Off California, LLOYD'S LIST, May
28, 1992, at 1.
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creditors creates a disincentive for lenders to finance fleet moderniza-
tion and replacement. Finally, OPA's offshore facility provisions ap-
pear unreasonable and may pose a threat to domestic oil production.
A. Financial Responsibility
The U.S. Coast Guard, which is responsible for implementing
OPA's vessel provisions, admits that "the jury is still out" on the most
serious prediction issued by industry analysts.71 The prediction, known
as the "train wreck" scenario, anticipates that all shipping activity in
U.S. waters could literally stop unless the currently unimplemented
insurance requirements of OPA are changed. Under OPA, owners of
vessels weighing more than 300 gross tons are required to maintain
evidence of financial responsibility sufficient to meet the maximum
amount of liability to which they might be exposed.72 Owners must
apply to the Coast Guard for a Certificate of Financial Responsibility
("Certificate") evidencing their ability to pay for cleanup and dam-
ages under OPA. If a vessel attempts to enter U.S. waters without a
Certificate, it "shall be subject to seizure by and forfeiture to the
United States."73
This procedure is not new, since shippers were already required to
obtain Certificates under preexisting laws, such as the FWPCA 74 and
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980 ("CERCLA").75 Currently over 23,000 vessels carry
Coast Guard Certificates.76 In obtaining these Certificates, the mari-
time industry has always relied upon insurance to provide the requi-
site evidence of financial responsibility.77 Under OPA, as under
preexisting law, the insurer occupies the position of guarantor and
must agree to be sued directly. However, OPA expands the liability of
responsible parties and their guarantors far beyond that recognized
under previous law.
Under the FWPCA, responsible parties and their guarantors were
only liable for removal costs and damages to natural resources. Dam-
ages suffered by private parties were compensable only under state
law, and even then, damages were limited to the value of the vessel
pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act. As previously discussed,
OPA removes federal limitations on liability under state law and in-
71. Telephone interview with Bruce Novak, OPA 90 Staff, U.S. Coast Guard (Jan.
14, 1994).
72. 33 U.S.C. § 2716.
73.. 33 U.S.C. § 2716(b)(3) (Supp. V 1988). The vessel owner is also subject to a
civil penalty of $25,000 per day of violation. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(7)(A) (Supp. V 1988).
74. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988).
76. United States Coast Guard, Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis: Finan-
cial Responsibility for Water Pollution (Vessels), CGD 91-005, July 12, 1993, at 26
,[hereinafter RIA].
77. Susan B. Geiger, Preparing For the Worst, TEX. LAW., Jan. 11, 1993, at 16.
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creases both the number and amount of damages compensable under
federal law.
The increased liability under OPA has prompted the Protection and
Indemnity Clubs ("P&I Clubs"), which provide indemnification cov-
erage for ninety-five percent of the world's oceangoing fleet, to an-
nounce that they will refuse to issue guaranties for the purpose of
complying with the new liability requirements. Under OPA, a guaran-
tor may only assert the same defenses available to responsible parties,
with the additional defense of willful misconduct of the responsible
party.78 Thus, traditional policy defenses and exclusions are unavaila-
ble. Most notably, as guarantors, the P&I Clubs would be unable to
invoke the pay-to-be-paid rule.79
Under preexisting law, the P&I Clubs did not object to being guar-
antors because liability was strictly limited. Under OPA, however,
P&I Clubs fear that, as guarantors, they would be exposing them-
selves to potentially unlimited liability. In addition, even when OPA's
liability limits are not breached, under its direct action and expanded
claims provisions, the P&I Clubs still would be forced to respond to a
multitude of claims, incurring enormous litigation costs. 80
Although the P&I Clubs have refused to provide proof of financial
responsibility, they continue to provide indemnity coverage to ship-
pers, albeit at a substantial increase in rates.8 ' A warranty provision
in the current policies specifically provides that the policies may not
be used as proof of financial responsibility under OPA.82
78. 33 U.S.C. § 2716(f) (Supp. V 1988).
79. P&I Clubs provide indemnity insurance, not straight insurance, to their mem-
bers. Under the basic principles of indemnity insurance, a P&I Club is only obligated
to pay one of its members if the member first pays the claim out of its own pocket.
Thus, if the liable member is unable to pay the claim, the P&I Club is under no obliga-
tion to pay the claim. RIA, supra note 76, at 75.
80. The numerous claims filed in connection with the August 17, 1993 Tampa Bay
spill are indicative of the diverse claims potentially recognized under OPA's liberal
damages provisions. Claims included those filed by commercial fishermen, marinas,
boaters, hotels, and businesses ranging from an ice cream shop to a water-scooter
renter. One claimant complained that she had to give her dog a bad haircut after a
wave lapped over the side of her boat and spotted the dog with tar. Laura Griffin,
Businesses, Residents File Claims For Damages, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 18,
1993, at 1A.
In addition to removal costs, the Act recognizes as compensable: natural resources
damages, loss of subsistence use of natural resources, real or personal property dam-
ages, damages for increased costs of public services, loss of profits and earning capac-
ity, and loss of revenues including taxes. 33 U.S.C. § 2702.
81. Less than two years after the enactment of OPA, the rates on a typical $700
million liability insurance policy for tankers making U.S. deliveries had increased
from 49 cents per gross ton to $7.12 per ton. Feldman, supra note 49, at 20. While
these costs ultimately have been passed on to consumers, their impact has been miti-
gated by the low price of imported oil. See DOE Unveils Oil and Gas Plan; Industry
Finds Little to Praise, OIL & GAS J., Dec. 20, 1993, at 21.
82. Price, supra note 45, at 21.
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While the Coast Guard has indicated that it will accept alternative
evidence of financial responsibility in the form of self-insurance,
surety bonds, or financial guaranties, these alternatives do not appear
to be viable options for most shipowners.8 3 The self-insurance option,
for example, is of little use to the industry because the Coast Guard's
proposed rule would permit only U.S. assets to be counted in estab-
lishing a company's net worth but requires the balance sheet to in-
clude worldwide liabilities. 4 The American Petroleum Institute has
indicated that not one of its member companies could meet the pro-
posed net worth test for self-insurance.85 Nonetheless, the Coast
Guard, bound by congressional intent, has rejected industry sugges-
tions for making the self-insurance option a viable alternative.
Initially, the industry suggested that vessel owners' participation in
the P&I Clubs be accepted as a $500 million asset for the purpose of
satisfying the self-insurance option. This would enable the P&I Clubs
to avoid direct action and use their policy defenses, since they would
not be providing direct evidence of financial responsibility. The Coast
Guard dismissed this suggestion, asserting that it was contrary to con-
gressional intent to assure claimants that vessel owners will have suffi-
cient funds to pay costs and damages under OPA. Since the P&I Club
could raise a number of policy defenses, including insolvency of the
vessel owner, the vessel owner might not have the right to demand
payment to the claimant by the Club.86
Furthermore, the industry suggested that the Coast Guard eliminate
the requirement to maintain assets in the United States by allowing
worldwide assets to be measured against worldwide liabilities. In re-
sponse to this suggestion, the Coast Guard noted that even under this
"modified assets" formulation of the rule, most U.S. and foreign in-
dependent tanker operators would not be able to self-insure. More-
over, such a rule would pose problems for claimants who would be
forced to pursue assets abroad. Under such circumstances, legal ex-
penses might often exceed recoveries. 87
As of Spring 1992, less than two percent of all Certificates issued by
the Coast Guard were supported by self-insurance.' Essentially, the
Coast Guard does not want vessel owners to increase their reliance
83. 56 Fed. Reg. 49,006 (1991) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. §§ 130-32, 1371) (pro-
posed Sept. 26, 1991).
84. The same method of calculation is applied to those attempting to evidence
financial responsibility with a financial guaranty. 56 Fed. Reg. 49,006 (1991). See also
Patrick Crow, Insuring Tankers, OIL & GAS J., Nov. 11, 1991, at 27 [hereinafter Crow
I].
85. Crow I, supra note 84, at 27.
86. RIA, supra note 76, at 71-76. See also Preliminary RIA Considers Four Op-
tions for COFR Regulations, OIL SPILL U.S. L. REP., Aug. 1993.
87. RIA, supra note 76, at 78-81. In support of this proposition, the Coast Guard
noted that Greece has legislation prohibiting enforcement of U.S. court judgments for
damages under OPA 90. Id. at 81.
88. Id. at 77.
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upon this option.89 Importantly, the Coast Guard has indicated that it
"does not consider self-insurance and financial guaranties to be iron-
clad methods of evidencing financial responsibility; assets can be dissi-
pated without the Coast Guard's knowledge, and continuous
monitoring of self-insured entities' asset bases is not feasible. Never-
theless, because OPA 90 allows these methods to be used, they are
included in the [proposed rule]."90
Since most vessel owners are no more capable of obtaining a suffi-
cient surety bond than they are of obtaining a financial guaranty or
establishing self-insurance, 91 the only remaining alternative is to ob-
tain insurance. However, the P&I Clubs have steadfastly maintained
that they will not issue coverage guaranties under OPA. This stale-
mate between the Coast Guard and the P&I Clubs has prompted
some industry analysts to declare the advent of "Armageddon" in the
oil industry. Indeed, the prospect of an OPA-induced energy crisis has
led the very congressional committees that drafted the law to become
concerned about its severity and to begin pressuring the Coast Guard
to "somehow make the new law work. 92
The Coast Guard's response has been to delay implementation of
the new Certificate provisions, accepting in the interim Certificates
issued under previous laws. In an effort to predict the likely effects of
its proposed regulations under OPA, the Coast Guard has conducted a
regulatory impact analysis.93 As a result of this analysis, the Coast
Guard concluded that if the P&I Clubs continue to refuse to provide
adequate guaranties of liability coverage to shipowners, the U.S. econ-
omy could be severely disrupted and a severe recession could ensue.
Then, not only the U.S. economy, but also worldwide economic mar-
kets would be disrupted. In the "train wreck" scenario, as much as
twenty-five percent of the oil supply to the United States would be cut
because oil tankers could not enter U.S. waters without a Certificate.
Furthermore, since OPA does not distinguish between vessels trans-
porting oil cargo and those propelled by fuel 'oil, dry bulk vessels
could not enter U.S. ports either. Thus, imported goods would have
to be shipped to Canadian or Mexican ports, increasing their transpor-
tation costs to the United States.94 By the same token, U.S. exports
89. Stacy Shapiro, Oil Spill Liability Crisis, Bus. INs., Aug. 2, 1993, at 2; see also
Preliminary RIA Considers Four Options for COFR Regulations, supra note 86.
90. RIA, supra note 76, at 85.
91. Preliminary RIA Considers Four Options for COFR Regulations, supra note
86.
92. Crow I, supra note 84, at 27.
93. RIA, supra note 76, at 26. Pursuant to Executive Order 12291, before issuing
major rules, federal agencies must prepare a regulatory impact analysis examining the
potential economic consequences of proposed rules. Although the Coast Guard's
proposed rule on Certificates of Financial Responsibility is not a major rule, the Coast
Guard prepared a regulatory impact analysis due to "widespread concern about the
possible economic effects of noncompliance with the rule." Id. at 4.
94. Id.; Shapiro, supra note 89, at 2.
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would become less competitive due to the increased transportation
costs of buyers.95
Despite these findings, the Coast Guard did not modify its original
proposed regulations, stating that these regulations "closely achieve"
the objective of the OPA.96 Moreover, the Coast Guard hinted that it
believes the P&I Clubs are bluffing: "[w]hether the reader [of the reg-
ulatory impact analysis] believes these'dire consequences would occur
depends upon whether the reader also believes that the P&I Clubs
will, in fact, not provide or will be prevented by their reinsurance con-
tract from providing the guaranties, and that no alternatives will be
available."97 'More recently, the Clinton Administration has urged
that the Coast Guard's proposed regulations be implemented "with
due haste" regardless of the P&I Clubs' stance.98 For now, the stand-
off continues.
B. Disincentives For Fleet Replacement and Modernization
OPA's financial responsibility provisions are not the only aspects of
the statute which pose a potential threat to future U.S. oil supplies.
The Act's imposition of liability solely on the vessel owner, not only
has created a disincentive for oil companies to carry crude oil in their
own vessels, but also has reduced incentives for charterers to choose
the best ship for oil transport. Although high profile oil companies
have begun to pay more attention to the quality of ships that move
their cargoes, when it comes down to the bottom line, many compa-
nies are still opting for the cheaper and older vessels. Most charterers
are simply not willing to pay more for better ships, even though there
are now serious worries about the environmental safety of older
vessels.99
New, environmentally preferred double hull tankers are fifteen to
twenty percent more expensive to operate.1° The end result is that
the newer and safer ships, which must charge higher transport rates to
break even, are often the least favored. Tanker owners complain that,
while major oil companies publicly claim they prefer first-class tank-
ers, they refuse to enter into long-term charter agreements that would
provide the kind of security needed to justify owners' investment in
new tankers. Rather, the major oil companies insist on operating in
95. RIA, supra note 76, at 85. Tim Sansbury, Coal, Grain Shippers Fear Backlash
of Spill Law, J. OF COM., Jan. 28, 1992, at 1A.
96. RIA, supra note 76, at 86.
97. Id.
98. Joel Glass, Clinton Urges Full Ahead On OPA, LLOYD'S LIST, Oct. 13, 1993.
99. Janet Porter, Oil Pollution Act Pushes Up Rates to the U.S., Tanker Owners
Say, J. OF COM., Nov. 13, 1991, at 5B.
100. Because environmentally preferred tankers weigh more' they must pay as
much as $60,000 more to transit the Suez Canal or use the Port of Rotterdam. Patrick
Crow, Owners' View of Tankers, OIL & GAs J.,' Mar. 8, 1993, at 23 [hereinafter Crow
II].
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the spot market. In the spot market, it is the cheap rustbucket tanker
that is the market leader and sets the rate. 1 1 Consequently, there is
little incentive for owners to replace or modernize their fleets.
The pace of ordering new ships began to decline in the second half
of 1990. By mid-1992, sixty percent of the world's tanker tonnage was
fifteen years old or older."° Moreover, recent orders for new tankers
have not been sufficient to'correct this trend.10 3
Notwithstanding these statistics, the world tanker industry contin-
ues to be dogged by overcapacity, which keeps transport rates low.
As a result, owners of new tankers, forced to compete with the older
vessels, are unable to get rates sufficient to amortize the cost of the
vessel over its life. Thus, it makes little sense to order new vessels.
Oil companies argue that the tanker industry is, responsible for the
overcapacity and consequent dearth of new vessel orders. They assert
that it is the responsibility of the tanker owners to scrap old vessels,
which would drive transport rates up and make new vessels profitable.
However, the old amortized vessels, built in the 1970s, are the only
vessels capable of making money in the current market. Therefore,
individual tanker owners are keeping them as long as possible.
The gradual phase-in of OPA's double hull requirement has created
a further incentive for owners to market their old tankers aggressively.
With the progressive deadlines looming, owners are induced to make
the most of the remaining economic lives of such tankers. Eventually,
however, these vessels will have to be scrapped in large numbers. The
result will be a possible shortage of crude carriers.
This is not to suggest that new tankers are not being built. How-
ever, new building has been slow. Despite the impending mandatory
retirement of single hull vessels, the major oil companies have largely
chosen to delay fleet replacement.' 4 In contrast to their public em-
brace of the double hull requirement following OPA's enactment,
these companies have, in practice, been far less than enthusiastic
about securing such vessels. Exxon and Texaco, for instance, have yet
to order any double hulled ships. °5 Although Amoco ordered a
double hull tanker during the media frenzy surrounding OPA's enact-
ment, it demonstrated its lack of resolve for fleet replacement by sell-
101. Dangerous Waters, ENERGY ECON., Nov. 1992; Tanker Industry Spokesman
Warns of Faults in US. Oil Pollution Law, supra note 1, at 41; Derek Bamber, Oil
Tankers Market Never Up For Long, PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, Aug. 15, 1991, at 15.
102. Tanker Industry Spokesman Warns of Faults in U.S. Oil Polution Law, supra
note 1, at 41.
103. As might be expected, given OPA's liability provisions, only four percent of
the new tanker orders are for the oil majors, reflecting their increased reliance upon
independent vessel owners. Id.
104. Lloyd's: US. Firms Delay Tanker Replacements, OIL & GAS J., Nov. 29, 1993,
at 31.
105. Id.
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ing the tanker to the Greeks even before construction was
complete."°
In contrast, Chevron has ordered two new tankers, and Mobil has
ordered one double hull tanker with an option for a second. 10 7 Of
course, these majors are not the only owners to invest in new tankers;
independent shipping companies have similarly invested. However,
the number of new orders does not appear, sufficient to meet the fu-
ture needs of the industry. Indeed, industry analysts warn that, as
OPA's progressive double hull requirements take effect, a serious
shortage of suitable tonnage is likely to occur.10 8 Over the next dec-
ade, to meet the expected need for new ships, the industry would have
to invest an estimated $200 to $350 billion."° Undoubtedly, this is a
significant sum even for the world oil industry.Of course, free market principles suggest that a shortage of modern
tankers will be met with an increase in tanker rates that, in turn, will
spur new tanker construction. To obtain sufficient capital for such an
investment, owners will necessarily turn to banks. However, serious
questions exist concerning whether sufficient financing will be avail-
able to fund the needed tonnage. Here again, OPA introduces diffi-
culties. Lenders occupy a precarious position under the new law,
which has made them more circumspect about shipping loans.
Lenders fear that they will be held liable under OPA. Given the
threat of unlimited liability under OPA, the potential for enormous
loss is very real. The law does not specifically exclude vessel mortga-
gees from the list of potential defendants, it merely defines a respon-
sible party as "any person owning, operating, or demise chartering the
vessel."110
The question on lenders' minds is whether U.S. courts will interpret
"ownership" or "operation" to encompass their security interest and
the correlative rights that accompany that interest. Some insight into
this question is provided by an examination of similar environmental
legislation and the jurisprudence arising thereunder. Like OPA,
CERCLA, which addresses marine pollution claims arising from haz-
ardous substances other than oil, places liability on "any person who
... owned or operated" a polluting vessel or facility."' Unlike OPA,
however, CERCLA excludes from the definition of "owner or opera-
tor" any "person, who, without participating in the management of a
... vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his
106. Dangerous Waters, supra note 101.
107. Id.
108. Janet Porter, Operators Fear Rush to Replace Old Ships, J. OF COM., Aug. 26,
1993, at 6A; Crow II, supra note 100, at 23. Tanker Industry Spokesman Warns of
Faults in U.S. Oil Pollution Laws, supra, note 1, at 41.
109. Joseph Bonney, Money For Ships? 'Yes, But...' Financial Sources of Shipping
Lines, AM. SHIPPER, May 1993, at 36.
110. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32)(A).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2).
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security interest in the vessel or facility."' a Notwithstanding this ex-
clusionary provision, the Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Fleet
Factors Corp., seized upon CERCLA's "overwhelmingly remedial"
goal to justify a broad imposition of lender liability. 113
In Fleet Factors, the court held that a secured lender could be liable
for pollution damage merely because it had the "capacity to influ-
ence" the borrower. Specifically, the court declared that:
[A] secured creditor may incur... liability, without being an op-
erator, by participating in the financial management of a facility to a
degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment
of hazardous wastes. It is not necessary for the secured creditor ac-
tually to involve itself in the day-to-day operations of the facility in
order to be liable .... Nor is it necessary for-the secured creditor to
participate in management decisions relating to hazardous waste.
Rather, a secured creditor will be liable if its involvement with the
management of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the infer-
ence that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so
chose.114
Following the Fleet Factors decision, the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA"), under pressure from the lending industry, issued an
interpretive ruling specifying that a lender's "mere capacity to influ-
ence" could not form the basis for liability under CERCLA. Rather,
for lender liability to attach, the lender must participate in the day-to-
day management of the facility or undertake responsibility for the
borrower's handling of hazardous substances.'1 5 While lower courts
have treated EPA's interpretive ruling as authoritative," 6 Fleet Fac-
tors has yet to be overruled, legislatively or otherwise.
Given the development of the law under CERCLA, lenders are un-
derstandably concerned about their potential liability under OPA,
which fails to provide even CERCLA's limited exemption for credi-
tors. Although it has been suggested that Congress left the creditor
exemption out of OPA precisely because the, Fleet Factors court had
interpreted it so broadly,'17 there is nothing in OPA's legislative his-
tory to support such an assertion. Indeed, given the high profile na-
112. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
113. 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100, as amended, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (Apr. 29, 1992). This
ruling comports with the Ninth Circuit's earlier interpretation of CERCLA's lender
liability provisions. See In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990) (ex-
pressly declining to follow Fleet Factors).
EPA's original rule, issued prior to the Fleet Factors decision, permits the lender to
foreclose on a vessel and hold the vessel for up to a year afterwards without losing its
liability exemption, provided the vessel is placed for sale. 40 C.F.R. § 300.
116. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Sonford Prods. Corp., 810 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Minn. 1993);
Kelley v. Tiscomia, 810 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
117. U.S. OPA Penalty Threat'May be Easing For Shipping Banks, LLOYD'S LIST,
Mar. 1, 1993.
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ture of the lender liability controversy under CERCLA, it may be
equally argued that congressional silence on the matter in OPA
evinces congressional satisfaction with the Fleet Factors standard."
18
In any case, such inconclusive arguments do little to assuage the fears
of lenders.
, The threat of lender liability, however, is consistent with OPA's goal
of insuring that ship owners have sufficient funds to pay for pollution
cleanup and damages. To protect themselves, lenders have imposed
increased collateral requirements upon borrowers that will make it in-
creasingly difficult for small shipping companies to finance modern
tonnage. The eventual result will likely be consolidation of shipping
concerns and a trend toward large, better capitalized companies, bet-
ter capable of compensating for pollution." 9
A more immediate result, however, may be a shortage of acceptable
tonnage as the chilled lending market struggles to accommodate the
impending rush for ship replacement. The prospect of a modern
tanker shortage is particularly daunting given the United States's cur-
rent dependence on imported oil. As of the second quarter of 1993,
net oil imports accounted for forty-five percent of U.S. consump-
tion.'2° This statistic takes on added significance when one considers
that as recently as 1985, net- imports accounted for only twenty-five
percent of consumption. 121 A reversal of this trend appears nowhere
in sight. The Energy Information Administration, for instance, has
projected net imports to reach fifty-two to seventy-two percent by
2010.122
C. Domestic Production
Given the threat to oil imports posed by OPA, one might hope that
the law would have a positive, or even neutral, impact upon domestic
production. Unfortunately, the law as currently interpreted seems to
pose an even greater threat to domestic production.
While the U.S. Coast Guard oversees OPA's application to vessels,
the Department of Interior's Mineral Management Service ("MMS")
is responsible for implementing OPA's provisions regulating offshore
oil facilities. 2 3 OPA requires the responsible party to establish and
maintain evidence of financial responsibility in the amount of $150
million. 124 Any party who fails to provide such evidence will be sub-
118. In this regard, it is important to note that OPA was enacted after the Fleet
Factors decision yet before the EPA's interpretive ruling.
119. Bonney, supra note 109, at 36.
120. DOE Unveils Oil And Gas Plan; Industry Finds Little To Praise, OIL & GAS J.,
Dec. 20, 1993, at 21.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Exec. Order No. 12,777, 3 C.F.R. § 351 (1992).
124. 33 U.S.C. § 2716(c) (1992).
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ject to a maximum penalty of $25,000 per day of violation and a possi-
ble judicial order terminating operations. 125
Prior to the enactment of OPA, offshore facilities, at least those lo-
cated on the outer continental shelf, were required to demonstrate
evidence of financial responsibility in the amount of $35 million. 26
Thus, for these facilities, OPA represents a more than four-fold in-
crease in the amount of capital required to demonstrate financial re-
sponsibility. Furthermore, in a shock to the oil industry, MMS has
indicated, in an advance notice of proposed rulemaking, that OPA's
financial responsibility requirement also applies to facilities located in
state waters. 127 This interpretation of OPA means that pipelines, ma-
rina fuel docks, tanks, and oil production facilities located in, on, or
under coastal waters, inland channels, lakes, and even wetlands would
be subject to the $150 million requirement. 28 Some commentators
suggest that the requirement would even extend to a tanker truck
crossing a bridge.129
While MMS's advance notice of proposed rulemaking caught much
of the industry by surprise, its content was largely dictated by OPA
itself. Congress left little leeway to MMS when it expressly defined
the law's terms. OPA defines "facility" as "any structure,... equip-
ment, or device (other than a vessel) which is used for... : exploring
for, drilling for, producing, storing, handling, transferring, processing,
or transporting oil. This term includes any motor vehicle, rolling
stock, or pipeline used for one or more of these purposes[.]"' 3 ° More
specifically, an "offshore facility" is defined as "any facility of any
kind located in, on, or under any of the navigable waters of the United
States, and any facility of any kind which is subject to jurisdiction of
the United States and is located in, on, or under any other waters
.... ,,... Further, OPA defines "navigable waters" as "the waters of
the United States, including the territorial sea[.]"'13 2
While it is evident that the effects of OPA, as provisionally inter-
preted, will be felt throughout the United States, the greatest impact
will be upon producers in the Gulf of Mexico and abutting states. The
vast majority of the operators affected by OPA's offshore facility pro-
125. 33 U.S.C. § 2716a (1992).
126. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
127. 57 Fed. Reg. 36,032 (1992).
128. See Lynn Hartley, Independents Seen Hit By MMS Spill Proposal, PLA-rr's
OILGRAM NEWS, Aug. 30, 1993, at 3 (comments of MMS Deputy Associate Director
Henry Bartholomew) [hereinafter Hartley I].
129. MMS Seeks OPA Damage Control, OIL & GAS J., Nov. 15, 1993, at 26.
130. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(9).
131. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(22) (emphasis added).
132. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(21).
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visions are located in the Gulf and in Louisiana's marshes and
wetlands. 133
Although major producers would have little difficulty meeting
OPA's financial responsibility requirement, in recent years, the major
oil companies have increasingly pulled out of the Gulf. Environmen-
tal pressures, restrictive governmental regulations, and a drilling mor-
atorium on promising federal lands in the eastern Gulf have led the
majors to withdraw a large portion of their exploration and produc-
tion budgets from the United States in favor of international pur-
suits. 134 In response to this exodus, small independent producers have
rushed in to fill the void. By October 1993, independents had made
ninety-three percent of all oil and natural gas discoveries and drilled
approximately eighty-five percent of all wells on Gulf tracts leased
since 1988.135 Indeed, these independents produce approximately
forty percent of U.S. crude and sixty percent of domestic natural
gas.' 36 Unfortunately, OPA threatens to bring this production to a
halt.
While MMS has yet to specify what forms of certification it will ac-
cept as evidence of financial responsibility, it is clear that very few
independent producers have sufficient assets to self-insure at the $150
million level. Thus, the vast majority of independents will have to
prove financial responsibility through alternative means, such as insur-
ance, surety bonds, or letters of credit. However, none of these alter-
natives appear to be readily available.
Insurance companies have already stated that, while they will con-
tinue to provide simple pollution coverage, they will not write cover-
age for the financial responsibility of offshore facilities. As is the case
in the vessel industry, offshore facility insurers fear OPA's potential
for unlimited liability. More specifically, insurers object to the fact
that the law makes them guarantors for oil companies in the event the
companies should fail.'37 They further suggest that there is simply not
133. Louisiana officials are especially concerned about OPA as 17-18% of all state
revenues are derived from the energy sector. An estimated 82% of Louisiana off-
shore crude oil and 77% of natural gas would be affected by the current interpretation
of the law. Lynn Hartley, Regulation & The Environment, PLATr's OILGRAM NEWS,
Nov. 29, 1993, at 3 [hereinafter Hartley II].
134. Sheryl Morris, IPAA Official Urges Review Of Liability Terms In Oil Pollution
Act, INSIDE ENERGY/wrrH FEDERAL LANDS, Sept. 6, 1993, at 11; Drillers Expand Ser-
vice Capabilities But Eye Costs In Restless World, OFFSHORE, Dec. 1992, at 22.
135. Bruce A. Wells, Implementing the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 Could Lead to
Sinking Independents Offshore and Onshore, PETROLEUM INDEPENDENT, Oct. 1993,
at 17.
136. John Yoder, Independents Too Might Walk The Plank If Oil Spill Liability Is
Increased, ENERGY REPORT, Nov. 8, 1993, at 3 (citing remarks of Robert Stone, Jr.,
senior vice president of First National Bank of Commerce).
137. Daniel Kaplan, Oil Industry Sees Catastrophe In MMS Proposal, THE ENERGY
DAILY, Dec. 13, 1993, at 2; William Mullins, Insurers On OPA Law: We Can't Do It,
PLATT'S OILORAM NEWS, Nov. 5, 1993, at 3; Wells, supra note 135, at 17.
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enough insurance available in the world market to insure every off-
shore facility at the $150 million level.'38 Yet, even if such coverage
eventually is available, the vast majority of independents will not be
able to afford the increased policy rates.139
Similarly, independent oil companies are unlikely to obtain suffi-
cient surety bonds or letters of credit. Bonding companies generally
demand five percent of the bond per year. Therefore, a $150 million
bond would amount to $7.5 million a year, an amount which exceeds
the entire yearly income of most independents."' Likewise letters of
credit are out of reach for most independents since banks have
already indicated that they will not extend such credit to companies
that face potential unlimited liability under OPA."4 ' Accordingly, in-
dependents, unable to satisfy OPA's financial responsibility require-
ment, will be forced out of the market.
In a study commissioned by the Department of Energy, the Na-
tional Petroleum Council concluded that the current interpretation of
OPA would radically undercut domestic production. 142 As much as
one-third of the oil and gas industry in the Gulf would be wiped out.
Those companies able to continue production will have to contend
with expensive insurance rates that will shorten the economic lives of
individual wells, inducing producers to leave otherwise recoverable
crude in the ground. The result will be a significantly increased de-
pendence on imported oil. In turn, tanker traffic and concomitant
risks of serious environmental damage will also increase. Thus, OPA's
offshore facility provisions seem to offend sound policy in both the
environmental and energy fields.
While MMS is aware of the dire predictions associated with its in-
terpretation of OPA, it does not believe any other interpretation
would withstand legal scrutiny. To the oil industry's great disappoint-
ment, the agency has been unable to locate any evidence of clear con-
gressional intent contrary to the literal language of the law.143 MMS
138. See Yoder, supra note 136, at 3; Lynn Hartley, MMS Hears Angry Words Over
$150-Mil, PLATr's OILGRAM NEWS, Nov. 4, 1993, at 3 [hereinafter Hartley III].
139. Michael Crowden, Will OPA 1990 Bring Closure?, OFFSHORE, Dec. 1993, at
15; Hartley I, supra note 128, at 3. According to Louisiana's Deputy Oil Spill Coordi-
nator, Tim Hebert, of Louisiana's 2000 oil and gas operators, only between 70 and 122
would be able to afford insurance under OPA. MMS Seeks OPA Damage Control,
OIL & GAS J., Nov. 15, 1993, at 26.
140. Crowden, supra note 139, at 15.
141. Hartley III, supra note 138, at 3. Furthermore, the inability to demonstrate
financial responsibility will result in the devaluation of independents' assets, causing
lenders to reevaluate their use as collateral. Thus, as one banker has stated, "the
source of capital from banks will dry up." Sheryl Morris, Opponents' Unanimous
Message To MMS: Revise The Oil Pollution Act, INSIDE ENERGY/WITH FEDERAL
LANDS, Nov. 8, 1993, at 9.
142. National Petroleum Council, Dec. 10, 1993 [hereinafter NPC Study].
143. U.S. Congress Hears Complaints on MMS Financial Responsibility Regula-
tions, OIL SPILL INTELLIGENCE REP., Nov. 4, 1993, at 5; MMS Oil Spill Liability Pro-
posal Starts. Congressional Review, ENERGY REP., Nov. 1, 1993.
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officials are convinced that the only way to soften OPA is for Congress
to make technical amendments to the law. To this end, the agency has
held numerous public hearings and has shared industry comments
with the appropriate congressional subcommittees. Congress, how-
ever, seems content to await the promulgation of the MMS's final
rule, which is not expected until 1996.
IV. PROPOSED REFORMS
Given the unusual specificity of OPA's provisions, regulatory agen-
cies such as the Coast Guard and MMS, are ill-positioned to adapt the
law to market realities. Although final rulings on the law's most prob-
lematic provisions have yet to be promulgated by either agency, it is
extremely doubtful that the final rules will vary significantly from the
proposed rules. Therefore, with the exception of lender liability, if the
problems mentioned in the foregoing discussion are to be averted,
Congress must act to do so.
A. Lender Liability
Since Congress did not address in OPA the status of entities holding
a security interest in vessels or offshore facilities, the respective agen-
cies have discretion to draft regulations on this matter. The agencies
should make clear that those entities will not be considered owners,
and therefore responsible parties, merely by virtue of their security
interest: Furthermore, the regulations should specify precisely which
types of affirmative action will be deemed sufficient to impose liability
on lenders. Such regulations would enable lenders to provide needed
capital for modern vessels and offshore production without fear of
lender liability.
B. Insurance Guaranty Provisions
In addressing the insurance stalemate, Congress should reexamine
the necessity of characterizing insurers as guarantors who are subject
to direct suit rather than indemnification proceedings. Understanda-
bly, Congress is concerned that, as indemnitors, insurers would be
able to assert various policy defenses against the polluter. If the pol-
luter is unable to pay and the insurer is able to avoid coverage, the
argument goes, taxpayers will be forced to foot the bill for cleanup.
However, such reasoning ignores the existence, or mischaracterizes
the nature, of the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund."' The Fund is sup-
ported by a five-cent-per-barrel tax on all imported and domestic oil
and is available for the payment of damages and cleanup costs in the
event the responsible party or guarantor is unable to satisfy those
costs. Hence, when payments from the Fund are made, it is the regu-
144. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701(11), 2712 (1988). The Fund was established by section 9509
of the Internal Revenue Code.
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lated industry, not the taxpayer, who foots the bill. Of course, these
costs are eventually passed on to consumers, but the same would be
true of expensive insurance premiums should insurers ever arrive at a
level of premiums sufficient to warrant their serving as guarantors.
Moreover, oil pollution statutes in a number of states currently do
not require P&I Clubs to issue guaranties. 4 ' In California, Washing-
ton, Florida, and Virginia vessel owners may prove financial responsi-
bility by submitting evidence of membership in a P&I Club. 46 These
states have determined that a P&I Club guaranty is unnecessary to
achieve oil spill deterrence and compensation goals.
Indeed, a study commissioned by the California Department of Fish
& Game concluded that an effective compensation system for oil spills
can be achieved without making insurers guarantors. 47 The study
compared California's Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act, which
does not provide for direct action against insurers, to OPA, which
does. The study found that there was no evidence to suggest that the
behavior of insurers differs in areas with or without direct action. Fur-
ther the study's authors stated that, to the best of their knowledge, the
dreaded hypothetical scenario in which the polluter is unable to pay,
thus preventing insurer indemnification from occurring, has never
arisen in U.S. history. In the event such a scenario should arise, the
Fund would provide an adequate safety net.
Thus, while OPA's direct action and guaranty provisions undoubt-
edly provide greater assurance that funds will be available for oil spill
compensation, the experience of history suggests that such provisions
are neither necessary nor essential to a workable oil spill statute. In
light of the continuing stalemate between the P&I Clubs and the
Coast Guard, Congress should reconsider the exigency of these
provisions.
C. Offshore Facilities
Even if unlimited insurance were available to offshore oil produ-
cers, most independent producers would not be able to afford the cov-
erage required by OPA. Here, again, congressional action is needed.
By requiring all owners of offshore facilities to maintain $150 million
in financial security, Congress failed to distinguish between the small
producer who has only a few wells and the major oil company who has
145. RIA, supra note 76, at 72-73; CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 8670.37.51-8670.37.57
(West 1992); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 88.40.020, 90.56.005-90.56.905 (1992 & Supp.
1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 376.011-376.319 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 62.1-44.34:14-62.1-44.34:28 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1993).
146. Id.
147. Mercer Management Consulting, An Analysis of the System of Oil Pollution
Control in California Marine Waters. See also Mercer Report Contradicts USCG Find-
ings on Impact of Pending COFR Rules, OIL SPILL INTELLIGENCE REP., Sept. 2, 1993.
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ownership interests in hundreds of wells.' Whether a facility pro-
duces 100 barrels per day or 100,000 barrels per day, OPA's coverage
requirement is the same. This is in marked contrast to financial re-
sponsibility for vessels where Congress set a sliding scale at $1200 per
gross ton.
Furthermore, the across-the-board $150 million requirement seems
to ignore the vast spill risk differential between offshore oil facilities
and tankers. Modern offshore production facilities are equipped with
sophisticated shut-off mechanisms that make significant spills unlikely.
When 1992's Hurricane Andrew ripped through the middle of Louisi-
ana's offshore operations, not a single reportable spill occurred, even
though 170 platforms were damaged or destroyed.149 Indeed, statis-
tics compiled by the National Petroleum Council show that between
1974 and 1991, tankers spilled more than twenty-five times the
amount of oil spilled by offshore producers. 150
Clearly, it is difficult to reconcile congressional rejection of a slid-
ing-scale approach to financial responsibility in regard to offshore fa-
cilities with its embrace of such an approach in regard to vessels.
Congress should consider this inconsistency and apply the sliding-scale
approach to offshore facilities as well as to vessels. This approach
might take into account a facility's size, storage capability, oil
throughput, proximity to sensitive areas, type of oil handled, and his-
tory of spills.15' Such an approach would presumably permit in-
dependent producers to secure adequate coverage and continue to
operate. In this way, both U.S. energy and environmental interests
would be protected.
CONCLUSION
By enacting the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Congress took a bold
step toward protecting the environment. Perhaps, however, the hor-
ror of the Exxon Valdez was too fresh in the American mind to permit
a calm, rational legislative reaction. Now that time has passed and
Prince William Sound is rebounding, it is time for Congress to revisit
OPA and make the adjustments necessary to ensure not only a healthy
environment, but a healthy economy as well.
148. Morris, supra note 141, at 9 (comments of Robert Stewart, president of the
National Ocean Industries Association).
149. Id. (comments of Patrick Taylor, CEO of Taylor Energy Co.).
150. See NPC Study, supra note 142.
151. U.S. Congress Hears Complaints on MMS Financial Responsibility Regula-
tions, OIL SPILL INTELLIGENCE REP., Nov. 4, 1993.
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